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THEORY FORMAT AND STRUCTURE AND SLA THEORY 
GRAHAM CROOKES 
University of Hawai'i 
SLA theory development has reached the stage where a meta-understanding of the 
forms and structures is needed to facilitate theory development. This paper reviews 
work in the philosophy of science pertinent to SL theory formats and structures, 
relating it to recent SLA theories. 
1. Introduction 
Within applied linguistics, calls for a theory of second language (SL) learning 
or acquisition (SLA; the terms will be used interchangeably) have become 
increasingly common since the 1970s, and a number of extended position 
statements have been produced (e.g., I<rashen, 1980, 1981, 1985; Schumann, 
1978; Spolsky, 1989; cf. Beretta, in press; McLaughlin, 1987)1. We have also 
begun to see some of these critiqued using criteria established within the 
philosophy of science (Gregg, 1984, 1989; Long, 1985). The use of such a basis 
for criticism has alerted the SL research field to the existence of an extensive 
body of work containing standards against which SL theoretical work can be 
judged. Most SL theoretical efforts, however, have not yet benefitted from a 
concern for such matters or a knowledge of the relevant literature. 
Foundational questions of this sort concerning the target of the SL research 
program and methods to attain it (cf Chaudron, 1986) are, however, essential to 
the development of the field. 
In this paper, I review conceptions of theory most relevant to SLA with 
particular reference to their structure (i.e., components, such as hypotheses, and 
their arrangement-logically-related, or otherwise) and to their format or 
surface characteristics (i.e, whether theories are primarily instantiated in logical 
1 Such proposals have been variously labelled 'theory', 'theoretical model', 'conceptual 
framework' etc. For discussion of the distinctions that can be made between these terms, 
see Giere (1979; cf. Brodbeck, 1959, Youngquist, 1971). 
University of Hawai'i Working Papers in ESL, Vol. 10, No.1, Spring 1991, pp. 57-94 
58 CROOKES 
symbols, computer code, grammatical symbols, thought, and so on). A 
multiplicity of meanings have been accepted for 'theory' because of the initially 
differing orientations of the various domains of science (see, e.g., Kantorovitch, 
1988, and for applied linguistics, Stern, 1983), together with the persistence of 
older understandings of the term in some disciplines coexisting uncomfortably 
with newer senses established in other disciplines. In addition, the tacit 
understanding of 'theory' by scientists has not always agreed with the meaning 
given it by philosophers of science, and the potential for confusion is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the nature and intent of theories is the subject of 
continuing debate in the philosophy of science. 
I take it as axiomatic that we cannot efficiently construct SL theories 
without a good understanding of what they are, both inside and out. I will 
initially lay out conceptions of (primarily) theory format, separating them by 
historical sequence, and to some extent by discipline-this refers to the 
11outside" of theories. In the next section I will present an overview of theory 
structures with reference to a key function of theory, explanation-this 
concerns the "inside". In the final major section of the paper I show how this 
determiner of theory structure should aid assessment of past work in SLA 
theory and guide future SL theorizing; I also return to format by discussing the 
role formalisms may have in future SL theories. 
2. Theory formats 
The interdisciplinary nature of applied linguistics has resulted in SL theorists 
inheriting several partial understandings of 'theory' and thereby theory format 
from our various contributory disciplines. In addition, SLA theories, precisely 
because of their interdisciplinary concern, may need to have the characteristics 
of theories from more than one discipline. Because of its historical precedence, 
the earliest and perhaps most dominant ideas concerning theory formats are 
those associated with the physical sciences, which I will consider first, followed 
by those of cognitive science. I will then briefly note recent developments 
applicable to SLA. 
/ 
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2.1 The 'Received View': the traditional philosophy of science perspective 
on theory format 
Concerning what a theory should look like, according to Giere (1985, p. 
344), "[s]ince Euclid there has existed a more or less continuous tradition of 
representing theoretical knowledge in the form of an axiomatic system". 
However, until the turn of the present century, there was little explicit direction 
as to what form a theory should take. Ideas about theory format became most 
prescriptive with the development of the philosophical movement of the 
nineteenth century known as positivism. Positivists (e.g., Mach, 1886, cited in 
Robinson, 1985) agreed with earlier scientists that theories should consists of 
statements of "general facts", that is, laws, but required additionally that 
theories be in no way "metaphysical", containing only empirically observable 
terms. In the subsequent development of logical positivism, implementing this 
requirement was seen as possible through the application of the newly 
developed science of logic, first to physics (e.g., Frege, 1893/1964; for historical 
review see e.g., Suppe, 1974) and thence to all other sciences. 
Positivists conceive of theories as organized only according to the 
canons of deductive logic... The effect of this is to force them to 
conceive very narrowly of theory and its ideal logical structure. 
(Harre, 1985, p. 53) 
In this conception, a theory is an abstract system of propositions, stated 
and related logically and derived from initial axioms, which represent a set of 
experimental laws and depict their interrelationships. Centrally, certain 
sentences are identified as generalizations, from which hypotheses can be 
deduced. The theory is therefore 'hypothetico-deductive', best expressed as 
logical propositions within a first-order predicate calculus (one of many 
possible logics). Such a theory has been referred to as an 'axiomatic' theory;2 
casting a theory in this form is 'axiomatization'. Until around the 1960s, there 
was general acceptance that all good theories were of this form. 
2 As distinguished within this tradition from 'set-of-laws' theories, which consist merely of 
sets of empirical generalizations not deductively related (Reynolds, 1971; for a more 
detailed classification of such theories cf. Hawes, 1975). 
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2.2 Cognitive science practice and theory format 
Theory formats in cognitive science3 have rarely fully conformed to 
Received View prescriptions. Consider the work of Hull {Hull, et al., 1940), one 
of very few in psychology to have direct contact with prominent figures of the 
logical positivist movement, and apparently the one major psychologist 
concerned to establish a formal axiomatic theory. In a systematic comparative 
analysis of pre-cognitive learning theories (Estes, et al., 1954) his efforts with 
regard to "explicitness of axiomatization" are evaluated highest of the five 
surveyed, yet fail to satisfy the standards of his commentator (Koch, 1954, p. 
59), who observes that 
the formalistic impression created by the elaborate verbiage of the 
postulates, the many symbols, and the mathematical trim tends to 
obscure many sources of ambiguity in the theory. 
Hull's attempts to develop behaviorist learning theory upon logical 
positivist principles were regarded as thoroughly misguided by members of 
this school (Smith, 1986). In Koch (1959), the other major comparative survey 
of psychology conducted in this period of Received View dominance, it is clear 
that theorists had mixed feelings about whether axiomatization was desirable 
or not. Even those who thought it useful tended to see their work as failing in 
this respect. Succeeding Hull as the major figure in this field, Skinner 
"explicitly reject[ed] theory construction by the axiomatic method" (Verplanck, 
1954, p. 300), but this anti-theoretical push was rebuffed for the study of 
language by Chomsky's (1959) review of Skinner (1957). Chomsky's initiation 
of modern linguistics provides a lead-in to the beginnings of cognitive science. 
Because of its dominant historical and ideological position (cf. Newmeyer, 
1980), the Chomskyan research program has played a major role in determining 
what one important section of cognitive science conceives of as theory. Formed 
in isolation from mainstream conceptions of scientific theory (because of its 
3 Hunt (1989, p. 603) defines cognitive science as consisting of "psychology, linguistics, 
anthropology, philosophy, computer science, and the neurosciences". Theories of SLA are 
primarily located within this grouping, with the possible exception of those which deal 
with SL learning as a psychosocial phenomenon (e.g., Schumann, 1978). 
THEORY FORMAT AND STRUCTURE AND SLA THEORY 61 
earlier association with anthropology) and influenced by its role in attacks on 
the preceding antitheoretical trend in psychology, theories in linguistics (and 
because of the influence of linguistics, in cognitive science generally) do not 
represent a smooth development of Received View conceptions of theory 
(neither format nor content). 
2.2.1 Theory formats in linguistics 
Modem theoretical linguistics primarily results from the development of 
Chomsky's ideas about language, and has been characterized by the 
proliferation of a family of formalisms-typically, directed graphs (phrase 
markers) and symbol strings (rewrite rules). For many outside the field, its 
theories might seem to have been correctly described by Pylyshyn (1973) who 
referred to them and to other competence theories in cognitive science as "set[s] 
of formal logical rules" (p. 31). Chomsky's ideas, however, have undergone 
several major conceptual shifts (Botha, 1989; Smith & Wilson, 1979; Starosta, 
1987; Steinberg, 1982) in which old terms have been retained while their 
meanings have been altered; there have been some consequent difficulties. 
From the earliest phase of Chomskyan linguistics, the connection between 
grammars, linguistic theory, and mainstream scientific theory was not clear. 
Sanders (1974, p. 3) notes that 
considerable misunderstanding has been generated ... by the largely 
idiosyncratic terminology that linguists have traditionally used in 
referring to the properties and components of linguistic theories. Thus 
in place of such familiar general scientific terms as "theory", ''law'', 
"axiom", "proof", and "theorem", one typically finds in linguistic 
discourse an entirely different metalanguage comprised of such 
specifically linguistic terms as "rule", "derivation", "grammar" ... 
These striking differences in metalanguage could easily lead one to 
suspect that linguistics is much different from other sciences than it 
really is.4 
4 In a footnote (1974, p. 3) Sanders explains how to make the necessary conversions: 
The law-like character of directed ... rules of grammar is ... apparent ... [A]ny 
phonetically-directed rule of the form "X->Y" is translatable without loss into a 
clearly law-like statement of the form "(for all X) (for all Y)[(X=Y) and (Y is more 
phonetically proximate than X)]". It is also possible to translate directed rules into 
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Additional complications may have arisen from a general understanding that 'a 
grammar is a theory of a language' or '... of linguistic competence', which 
might have been stimulated by comments such as the following: 
What we seek, then, is a formalized grammar that specifies the correct 
structural descriptions with a fairly small number of general principles 
of sentence formation and that is embedded within a theory of 
linguistic structure that provides a justification for the choice of this 
grammar over alternatives. Such a grammar could properly be called 
an explanatory model, a theory of the linguistic intuition of the native 
speaker. (Chomsky, 1962, p. 533) 
Assuming the set of grammatical sentences of English to be given, we now ask 
what sort of device can produce this set (equivalently, what sort of theory gives 
an adequate account of the structure of this set of utterances). (Chomsky, 1966, 
p. 18). Postal (1964/1967, p. 3) observes however, that whereas 
a grammar must be an explicit formal device which enumerates all 
and only the well-formed strings and which automatically assigns to 
each sentence a correct structural description (SO), 
a linguistic theory, by distinction, is to be a general account of common features 
of grammars, and must contain 
1) a precise characterization of the possible types of grammatical rule and 
their possible interrelations. 
2) a characterization of the kinds of SD [structural description]. 
3) a mechanical procedure (algorithm) for associating a unique SD with 
each enumerated sentence. 
4) an evaluation procedure or metric of simplicity for grammars to choose 
the best grammar out of all those compatible with the data. (Postal, 
1964/1967, pp. 3-4) 
conditional statements, e.g., "For any linguistic object 5, if X is a representation of 
S, then Y is a phonetically more proximate representation of 5". 
However, this remark seems to indicate that here, a grammar is indeed being assumed to 
be equivalent to a hypothetico-deductive theory, rather than a formal device, ~ Ia Postal 
(1964/1967). 
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The position that linguistic theories were formal symbol systems which 
generated 11Sentences" allowed the perception that linguistic theories were 
closest in format to other theories in cognitive science (those in AI, for example) 
as opposed to those in the hard sciences. However, in the last decade 
mainstream American theoretical linguistics has become interested in specific 
grammars mainly for the light they throw on general characteristics of human 
knowledge of language (universal grammar /UG), so it may be more accurate 
to say now that linguistic theories (as opposed to grammars) primarily consist 
of general statements from which together with specific grammars can be 
deduced hypotheses about language competence (indirectly testable via 
performance data). 5 
2.2.2 Computational theory formats 
Elsewhere in cognitive science, the position developed that theories of 
human cognition can desirably be set out as computer programs which 
normally make use of production system models (Newell, 1967; Newell & 
Simon, 1961) typified by pairs of If~Then statements. Most generally, the 
position is that 
a computational theory of thought must define the mentalese language 
and describe a hypothetical machine that can execute programs 
written in it. (Hunt, 1989, p. 604) 
Though the 'theory as program' position has been widely accepted, it has been 
attacked on both relatively traditional grounds concerning aspects of theory 
construction, and also as a result of newer developments. Under the former 
category, Simon (1979) remarks that 
bits and snatches of a program, reconstructed programs, a detailed 
program in its entirety, or even 'the theory behind a program' could 
5 Linguistic theories are naturally 'property' rather than 'transition' theories-see Section 3 
below, and they explain primarily by 'reducing the number of independent phenomena' 
(as defined in Aronson, 1984, pp. 171-184) rather than in a deductive-nomological fashion 
(Dretske, 1974; Miller, 1990; Starosta,1987; but cf. Hintikka & Sandu, 1991, p.S, who state 
that "GB theorists ... use an antiquated hypothetico-deductive model of science"). 
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each constitute the theoretical ingredients of a computer simulation. 
Yet, practically speaking, it is doubtful that a complete computer 
program ever constitutes a theory. Many elements of a program ... are 
irrelevant to theory construction... [T]he theoretically relevant features 
[must be extracted] from the program. Unfortunately... any number 
of verbal theories may be extrapolated from the same program. 
Moreover, simulationists must constantly guard against ... 
constructing a program that is more complex than the phenomena 
being studied. Yet, if we keep these difficulties in mind, it seems 
legitimate to speak, however loosely, of programs as theories.(p. 234) 
Very similar comments are made by Pinker (1984, p. 351), and for Luce (1989, 
pp. 126-7), the programmed simulation of vision utilized in the respected work 
of Kosslyn (1980) was 
simply one programmer's version of what he believed Kosslyn had in 
mind as was evolved from discussions and informed by repeated 
computer printouts. 
Luce also observes of this approach to theory construction in general that 
the programs are in no way uniquely determined by the principles, 
and so far as I can see they are communicable from one person to 
another only in the form of long listings of computer code. 
In other critical discussion of such work, again using Kosslyn as an 
example, Finke (1989) notes that it abandons predictive power in its attempts to 
make the program fit the data, and thus explain it, and van Lehn, Brown, & 
Greeno (1984) remark that examples of the degree of fit and associated 
argumentation rather than proof are the principal means of support for 
programs. Another problem that has a familiar ring to SLA researchers is that 
nearly every researcher who has developed production system models 
of significant complexity has developed his own architecture and 
associated language. (Neches, Langley & Klahr, 1987, p. 18) 
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An alternative format for computational theories is embodied in models of 
cognition labeled 'associationist', 'connectionist', or 'parallel distributed 
processing (PDP)'. These have burgeoned rapidly since the mid-1980s 
(Schmidt, 1988), and can be seen by some (e.g., Pinker & Prince, 1987) as 
representing uan intermediate level between symbol manipulation and neural 
hardware" (Schmidt, 1988, p. 59). In this type of model 
learning takes place through the strengthening and weakening of the 
interconnections in a particular network in response to examples 
encountered in input. (Schmidt, 1988, p. 56) 
The units in such a network are elementary, no symbol representation or 'ifw 
then' statements are required, and in, for example, a PDP model of first 
language learning, there is no representation of 'rules': "The child need not 
figure out what the rules are, nor even that there are rules" (Rumelheart & 
McClelland, 1986, p. 267, cited in Schmidt, 1988; see also Sokolik, 1990). 
Currently, hybrid models are being developed which utilize aspects of both 
parallel (associationist) and sequential (production system) types of computer 
modelling {cf. references in Klahr, et al., 1987). Both kinds, however, are 
primarily represented and instantiated as computer programs--associationist 
versions showing, rather than Ifw Then statements, matrices of weightings of the 
elementary units from which their systems are constructed. 
2.3 Developments in philosophy of science concerning theory format 
Contemporaneous with the rise of cognitive science, philosophy of science 
underwent changes in many areas. For present purposes, we should note a 
relatively smooth development of the earlier concern for axiomatization, under 
which theories became seen not as sets of propositions, but as "extralinguistic 
entities which may be described or characterized by a number of different 
linguistic formulations" (Suppe, 1974, p. 221). Initially associated with Suppes 
(1957), the 'Semantic Approach', or 'Model-theoretic Approach' has been 
developed by Suppe {e.g., 1989) among others (d. Balzer, Moulines, and Sneed, 
1987; da Costa & French, 1990; Sneed, 1971; Stegmiiller, 1973; Westmeyer, 1989). 
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In this approach, a theory constitutes a set of mathematical models6 
underlying the phenomena or systems to which the theory pertains, and is 
depicted as a collection of elements and their relations, formally stated using 
set-theory terms. This development was motivated particularly by an 
awareness of the inability (by standards of logic) of first-order predicate 
calculus to adequately represent theories (e.g, Suppe, 1967), as well as the 
unnecessarily limited perspective of the Received View that the relationships 
between elements of such structures were simply deductive relations among 
statements. Currently most axiomatization of theories which have been 
initially promulgated non-formally utilizes 11Semantic/model-theoretic 
methods" (da Costa & French, 1990, p. 250, and cf. Westmeyer, 1989). This 
approach is a direct outgrowth of a philosophy of science which sees itself as 
systematizing the work of scientists, as the logical positivists had done 
previously. 
Despite the existence of this more developed set-theoretic form of 
axiomatization, it is noteworthy that 11Scientists in the twentieth century rarely 
present theories in axiomatic form" (Giere, 1985, p. 344, referring to biology, 
geology and even physics), and Reynolds (1971, p. 97), states that the scarcity of 
this type of presentation ~~suggests that it has either been impossible or 
inconvenient for social scientists to put their ideas into this format''. This may 
not have been a serious failing. From about 1950 onwards, the Received View 
came under severe attack, and one by one the tenets of logical positivism were 
eroded (e.g., Quine, 1951; cf. Manicas, 1987, for review). However, the 
Received View, often widely misunderstood, lived on as an ideal, particularly 
in the social sciences. One possible reason may have been that the position 
taken on the correct form of a theory by logical positivist philosophers of 
science (based on a post hoc, rational rather than empirical, reconstruction of 
the results of scientific thinking and research} made little contact with 
scientists' own modes of operation and exposition (cf. Rubinstein, Laughlin, & 
6 Care must be exercised concerning the way this line of work understands the term 'model': 
It is used 
in the sense of a thing depicted by a picture (= by a theory) ... e.g., when one says 
that a woman is the model of a painting. Here, the model is the person depicted 
and the painting is the picture of it ... our use of "model" is consistent with this 
artistic usage. (Balzer, Moulines, & Sneed, 1987, p. 2) 
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McManus, 1984; Suchman, 1988), preventing any corrective feedback loop from 
operating. Scientists' pronouncements on correct methodology might 
sometimes reflect those of philosophers of science, but there is and was no 
guarantee that their actions do so (Kantorovitch, 1988).7 
Recent major developments within philosophy of science have responded 
to these sorts of considerations by focusing on the social and in particular 
psychological aspects of scientific theories. This has been referred to as the 
naturalization of philosophy of science (Giere, 1985) which has brought this 
area of investigation closer to empirical rather than rational studies, and to 
what scientific practice actually is, rather than a reconstruction of what it ought 
to be. The development of sociology of science {e.g., Latour & Woolgar, 1979) 
and particularly psychology of science (e.g., Gholson, Shadish, Neimeyer & 
Houts, 1989) following the historical work of Kuhn (1962) has provided insight 
into knowledge creation as a cognitive process in which theories are working 
instruments. In this context, a theory is conceived of as a 'cognitive object', that 
is to say, something primarily instantiated in the mind (e.g., Giere, 1988). As 
such it precedes its various possible linguistic or logical formulations, and 
reflects also the fact that the human mind in general and the scientist in 
particular make extensive use of analogical and iconic models when explaining, 
conceptualizing, and attempting to solve problems (e.g., Callebaut & Pinxton, 
1987; Clement, 1989; Darden, 1983; Harre, 1960; Hesse, 1963; Leary, 1990). A 
theory in this tradition is seen as "a statement-picture complex" (Harre, 1970, p. 
56) of which the pictorial element relates to the model (or the hypothetical 
mechanisms; Harre, 1970, p. 54) involved in the theory, and the statements 
relate to generalizations the theory supports (Giere, 1988; Harre, 1970, 1985a, 
1985b, 1986; Suppe, 1974). This perspective on theory format is motivated not 
by a desire to clean up and clarify the work of scientists, but rather to 
adequately express what scientists are presenting in their theories. In 
particular, a new element is added to the list of components implied in the 
Received View- besides the statements of the earlier view (which no longer 
7 Einstein is often cited to this effect, and Suppe (1974), referring to an important symposium 
on the structure of scientific theories occuring in 1969, notes that many scientists attending 
recognized the relevance of the discussions to their own practice, but were unable to 
understand them because of their lack of background! 
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need be deductively related), we now have in addition the model, which is 
needed for explanatory purposes. 
The failure of traditional ideas in philosophy of science to link up with the 
actuality of scientific practice may be interpreted to mean they are not adequate 
bases for critiquing theories in science generally. Cognitive science, as we have 
seen, has in any case pursued its own idiosyncratic course Now that 
philosophy of science has caught up with what scientists actually do, does it 
have anything to offer SL researchers faced with problems of theory 
assessment? To answer this question, I move from simply describing possible 
and actual theory forms and elements in historical sequence, to considering a 
basis for theory choice. 
3. Theory structures assessed on the basis of explanatory adequacy 
Over time, a number of different aims have been posited as likely to be 
achieved by the construction of theories, and such aims can be used as the basis 
for assessing theories typified by their content or structure. The most 
prominent purpose of a theory is to explain, and although explanation is not 
valued by all philosophers of science (e.g., van Fraassen, 1980) it seems to be 
agreed on as a prime criterion for most theories (Suppe, 1972) including SLA 
theories (e.g., Gregg, 1990; Long, 1990). What is meant by ~explain' has been 
the subject of extended dispute, however {cf. Kitcher & Salmon, 1989; Pitt, 
1988). Two major kinds of explanation were in play during the development of 
cognitive science, neither particularly appropriate for the needs of SLA. First is 
"deductive nomological (D-N)" explanation, central to the Received View and 
recognized by logical positivists as the most desirableS (Hempel, 1966; 
Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). In this type of explanation, to explain an 
individual fact we deduce it from one or more other such statements in 
conjunction with one or more generalizations of laws. (Brodbeck, 1968, p. 363) 
8 Other kinds of explanation were considered, especially in Hempel (1965), where notably, 
explanation by analogy in science and in scientific theories is reviewed and dismissed, 
because it is part of the "pragmatic"aspects of explanation, and does not contribute to the 
logical analysis of explanation. 
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The fact in question is in almost every case an event or a regular 
occurrence of events. For example, to explain an occurrence of water freezing, 
the Received View requires a set of initial conditions (the water in the beaker 
was cooled to 0 degrees Celcius), a law (water freezes at 0 degrees Celsius), and 
the event (the liquid water became solid ice) is thereby "explained". To refer to 
a more large-scale example, this is also the kind of explanation presented by the 
(Newtonian) laws of mechanics-the most paradigmatic theory in science, and 
one often presented as a formal, axiomatic, hypothetico-deductive system. 
The second kind of explanation is systematic, or functional explanation. 
In this type of explanation 
the explanandum [that which is to be explained] of a systematic 
explanation is always a capacity, as opposed to an event or regularity 
(the typical explananda of deductive-nomological explanations). The 
capacity is explained systematically if the thing whose capacity it is is 
analyzed as a set of interacting components whose individual 
capacities and interactions together give rise to the capacity being 
explained ... 
It is desirable to juxtapose these two types of explanation. The former 
appear in 'transition theories', the latter occur typically in 'property theories' 
(Cummins, 1983). Transition theories attempt to explain the changes in states 
of systems; that is, they take events as the phenomena to be explained, and they 
do so by subsuming events under laws. Property theories, by contrast, are 
concerned only with describing the systems themselves and are analyses of 
static systems-primarily ways of representing competences or bodies of 
knowledge. They thus have a different function and orientation to the typical 
"hard science" theory, which is a transition theory.9 
9 Garfield goes on to point out the layered nature of an extensive theory in cognitive science, 
observing that 
explanations may ... become ... deductive-nomological at lower levels, as the 
capacities or regularities of the interacting components into which the original 
system is decomposed by the original explanation are themselves explained. 
(Garfield, 1988, pp. 26-7) 
This may explain past confusion concerning the intent and format of both part of linguistic 
theory (i.e., grammars, as discussed earlier) and also of computational theory formats in 
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Although cognitive science now has transition theories (cognitive learning 
theory, e.g., Anderson; leamability theory, e.g., Pinker, 1984; and of course any 
SLA theory) the early development of cognitive science was characterized by 
the development of competence theories embodying systematic explanations-
for example, cognitive information-processing theories, or theories of linguistic 
competence (cf. Bialystok, 1990). At that time and until recently, ideas in 
philosophy of science concerning theory construction almost exclusively 
referred to and drew on theories in physical science. It may be that theory 
construction in cognitive science was hindered by the fact that philosophy of 
science concepts of theory construction have until recently been based almost 
exclusively on a type of theory and a kind of explanation different to that which 
cognitive scientists were actually trying to construct. 
Obviously, property theories, though important in themselves, are not 
sufficient for studies of development or acquisition. Though a theory of the 
development of a system (such as the development of the ability to 
communicate in a second language) presumably should deal with the system's 
states, it must primarily explain transitions between states. It is on the grounds 
of adequacy of such explanations that traditional transition theories, that is, 
hypothetico-deductive theories of the Received View type, have been criticized. 
For example, many would argue that a better explanation of the instance of 
water freezing presented earlier would first state the composition of water 
(composed of particles) and then refer to how a disordered group of particles 
can be put in order by aligning them in two and three dimensions, in ranks and 
files, or in a grid or latticework, and that this is only possible when the particles 
can stick to each other and are not in motion. In constructing such an 
explanation appeal is made to our existing knowledge of the physical world 
(models) and specifically conditions and a mechanism for one model (a mess) 
to change into another (an arrangement). To again take a more general case, 
Newtonian mechanics, because of its paradigmatic status mentioned earlier, 
has been subjected to the sort of criticism implied in this example. The main 
charge leveled against it is that it is primarily descriptive rather than 
explanatory, since it does not present the mechanisms by which, for example, a 
cognitive science. 
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particular path of motion is achieved by a moving body (Harre, 1985a, p. 170; 
cf. also Giere, 1988e). 
Transition theories reflect the weaknesses of philosophical investigations 
of explanation (e.g., Achinstein, 1983; cf. Pitt, 1988, van Fraassen, 1980) which 
have concentrated on the explanations of particular events. This is another 
example of the Received View in philosophy of science failing to connect with 
actual science, since (according to Cummins, 1983, and Kim, 1973) this is not 
the sort of explanation scientists expect from a scientific theory. Giere (1988, 
and cf. Woodward, 1979) argues that 
a large part of any cognitive theory of explanation would be an 
account of how people deploy various sorts of schemata in giving 
explanations ... 11Scientific'' explanations ... deploy models developed 
in the sciences. (Giere, 1988, p. 105) 
This brings us to more recent developments in philosophy of science's 
understanding of both theories and explanations, facilitated by the 
naturalization of philosophy of science mentioned earlier, and to theory 
structures more useful for SLA. 
It has been suggested that in order to understand scientific explanations 
(and thus construct adequately explanatory theories), we should investigate in 
detail the resources for scientific explanations, which in Giere's view are 11Sets 
of well-authenticated models" (1985, p. 105). Here he is at one with Harre 
(though neither Harre nor Giere refer to each others' work), who holds that 
real-world explanations of events are most complete when they occur through 
the exposition of the mechanism which connects events-that is, through the 
analysis of the structure of a modeJlO analogous to the system being 
researched. Since the basis for this kind of explanation (according to Harre, 
1960, 1970) is analogy, 11 we may expect to find analogies (explicit or implicit) 
tO In his sketch of a cognitive theory of science, Giere has argued that a theory is composed of 
"(1) a population of models, and (2) various hypotheses linking those models with systems 
in the real world (1988, p. 85)". This use of 'model' refers to a paradigmatic abstraction 
from a real-world system, in which central concepts of a theory apply, and which in turn 
can be used as the basis for understanding and solving problems pertaining to related 
realworld systems. (Cf. also Giere, 1979, p. 69, for his earlier definition (and helpful 
supporting discussion) of theory as simply "a kind of natural system". 
72 CROOKES 
in fully explanatory scientific theories. This is because the mechanisms sought 
as the basis for explanation do not easily reveal themselves, but must be 
inferred. In the process of developing a theory, as data then generalizations 
accumulate, the underlying structure of phenomena and the causal 
relationships between events must be constructed. Only by building on 
preexisting knowledge of similar structures to be found elsewhere can this be 
done-that is, by a process of analogy. 
Analogical relations hold between the system under investigation, 
including its differing states at different times, and a model of this research 
object. The source of the model will be different from the system being 
modelled (unlike the case of a model airplane), because the thing to be 
modelled is at least in part unknown. Harre (1970, and cf. 1985a, b) terms such 
models 'paramorphs', and identifies three types in which the analogy is not 
precise, and thus conceptually productive (pp. 44-5): 
I distinguish singly connected, multiply connected and semi-
connected paramorphs... the corpuscular theory of gases is singly 
connected, because the principles of only one science, mechanics 
[apply]... [An early model of the atom] is multiply connected [since it] 
draws on the sciences of mechanics and electromagnetism ... Freud's 
11 Early proponents of this view (listed and dismissed in Hempel, 1965) were regarded as 
unorthodox or misguided by the Recieved View, but the philosophical line associated (by 
Bhaskar, 1975) with Scriven, Hanson, Hesse and Harre, along with recent psychologically-
oriented investigations have renewed understanding of metaphor, analogy, and model in 
scientific thinking (cf. Gentner, 1982; Lashchyk, 1986; Leary, 1990). These closely related 
concepts need distinguishing: 
The relationship of model and metaphor is this: if we use the image of a fluid to explicate 
the supposed action of the electrical energy, we say that the fluid is functioning as a model 
for our conception of the nature of electricity. If however, we then go on to speak of the 
'rate of flow' of an 'electrical current', we are using metaphorical language based on the 
fluid model. (Martin & Harre, 1982, p. 100) 
The connection between model and mechanism is extremely close. Harre (1970) 
distinguishes between cases where the application of model to research object is by 
way of a "causal transform" and where it is by way of a "modal transform". The 
latter posits a question like "Is gas temperature really only another way of looking 
at mean kinetic energy of the molecules?"; the former would be "Is gas pressure 
caused by the impact of molecules?". He notes that under a causal transform the 
iconic model "can come to be looked at as a hypothetical mechanism" (p. 54). 
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'psychic energy' mind model is semi-connected because [it draws on] 
some principles of energetics from physics [but] also introduces 
processes occurring according to principles unknown to energetics, or 
any other science... Sometimes semi-connected paramorphs are just 
what give us a new scientific development, by suggesting the idea of a 
new kind of entity, or process. 
In addition 
is by being associated with a paramorphic model... that many laws of 
nature get their additional strength of connection among the 
predicates they associate, that distinguishes them from accidental 
generalization. A scientific explanation of a process or pattern among 
phenomena is provided by a theory constructed in this way. (Harre, 
1970, pp. 46-7) 
So the argument is: Good theories are those which provide the fullest 
explanations, which they do through providing a model of a system and (if 
they are transition theories) mechanisms depicting the movement of systems 
from one state to another. Concisely, a theory necessarily has two parts: (1) a 
pictorial part, or iconic model, and (2) some associated sentences which refer to 
the regularities it supports. 
4. Implications for SLA theory 
These recent developments in philosophy of science concerning the internal 
and external character of a theory naturally have implications for SLA. First, 
the criticisms of "logicism"12 eliminate any suggestion that an SLA theory 
consist solely of propositions or hypotheses connected by deductive logic (the 
Received View position). Second, the conception of model and associated 
mechanism as essential parts of a theory (the line associated with Harre) 
implies that their role in existing conceptual proposals in SLA theoretical work 
should be investigated. At the same time it is possible to use this 
12 The assertion that scientific investigation proceeds best according to deductive logic, and 
should result in theories constructed of propositions connected by deductive logic 
(I<antorovitch, 1988). 
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understanding of the concept of model, and particularly of the role of 
mechanism in providing psychologically-satisfying scientific explanations to 
identify promising aspects (and weaknesses} of current SLA thought. Finally, 
developments in the axiomatization of theories can speak to the topic of 
formalism in SLA theory. 
4.1 Models in existing SLA theories 
In the present formulation, I take 'model' to refer to the central metaphor 
or explanatory analogy utilized by a theory. In the case of the second language 
learning system embodied in human cognition, the model provided is often 
that of another human attribute, or a central cognitive process known to exist in 
human cognition but not yet applied to the case of SLA. Models in SLA are 
typically not explicitly presented and are often not clearly developed. This may 
be because investigators have not fully recognized their utility and legitimacy. 
I will simply mention two-one being that of Krashen, as he is the 
paradigmatic "theorist'' of SLA, the other that of Ellis, since he actually uses the 
term 'model'. 
One model underlying Krashen's theory is that of a ladder (cf. also 
Kellerman's 1984 use of the term}. When data are observed to show temporal 
discontinuities associated with discrete improvements in competence, 
subsuming them under stages is the first step in theorizing. This says little 
more than that we presume that progress in this case requires the accumulation 
(or possibly loss) in a step-by-step fashion of elements which are sequentially 
arranged in a series of prerequisites. The metaphor is so familiar to us that 
defining it seems banal, but its explanatory value is seen if the question 'Why 
can't the speaker say that yet?' is answered by saying 'That is a stage 5 
structure and the speaker is at stage 2'. Yet this obviously fails to answer the 
question of how a learner moves from one stage to the next-something that 
can only be answered by considering the explanatory mechanisms implied in 
the theory. 
It might be thought that the basic model which Krashen provides to 
explain how an individual progresses in SL learning is "the learner as 
sponge"-but in fact the main model provided is that of the child. For 
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I<rashen, it is the learner's continuing ability to access the language acquisition 
device (LAD) that Chomsky proposed as part of the child's innately-endowed 
cognitive capacities which enables a learner to acquire a SL without conscious 
attention to the form of input. However, the extent to which Krashen 
understands or utilizes this concept in its full complexity is disputable {d. 
Gregg, 1988). If he were saying adults have access to the LAD, i.e., that L2 
learning is the same as L1learning, this would be an explanation of a sort. If he 
were arguing, say, that L2learning makes some use of a LAD with specified 
modification, this would be possibly more interesting, and indeed typical of the 
sort of partial analogy {e.g., Harre's semi-connected paramorph) discussed 
earlier as a fruitful aspect of scientific theorizing. Regrettably, even his more 
detailed presentations (e.g., I<rashen, 1983) do not provide a clearly worked out 
position, as Gregg (1988) makes plain. 
Ellis names his depiction of SLA the 'Variable Competence Model' (e.g., 
Ellis, 1985a). The (sketchy) explanatory mechanisms it posits follow from the 
modelling of the second language learning system on a traditional cognitive 
information-processing model with short and long-term memory stores, within 
which skill-learning occurs via automatization through use. In Ellis's model, 
the learner moves linguistic knowledge, or rules, from one store or condition to 
another, with changes in their associated accessibility, both through operating 
on input and through producing output. Although the theory is rather vague 
{among other problems, cf. Gregg, 1990), it gains plausibility because of its 
similarity to a system that many SL investigators would accept as fairly well 
established .. Future work using Ellis's concepts could develop by drawing 
more heavily on the potentially explanatory metaphors inherent in the 
relationship that elements of the model have to their apparent sources in the 
cognitive information-processing model of human cognition and in production 
system models of human skill learning. 
4.2 Mechanisms in existing SLA theories 
The function of a mechanism in a theory of language acquisition is to 
show how the transition from a representational system at ti to a 
representational system at ti+l is effected. In order to do that it is necessary to 
specify some interaction between input, cognitive procedures and a 
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representational system at ti whose product is a representational system at ti+l. 
11 
••• The cognitive procedures [used so far in research have been] ... 'general 
cognitive strategies' or ad hoc 'acquisition devices'." {McShane, 1987, p. 115) 
McShane subsequently gives some more explicit descriptions of 
mechanisms to be found in early L1 learnability literature {Atkinson, 1982): 
association, differentiation, generalization, and hypothesis testing constrained 
by innate principles {see also MacWhinney, 1987: a more recent L1 collection 
solely on this topic.) However, constructors of SL theory have yet to catch up 
with these ideas, as shown in the most recent summary work on SL theory 
(Spolsky, 1989). In traditional terms, this is simply a set of laws-"! use the 
term theory to mean a hypothesis or set of hypotheses that has been or can be 
verified empirically'' (Spolsky, 1989, p. 2)-and no mechanisms are provided 
on which to base the understanding of the processes of SLA that his work is 
presumably intended to provide. Generally, mechanisms in SLA theories "tend 
to be rather vaguely defined and poorly supported" (Long, 1990, p. 654). An 
overview of mechanisms utilized in recent SL theories is given in Larsen-
Freeman and Long's (1991) review of SL theory, which they divide into three 
representative categories-nativist, environmentalist, and interactionist. (The 
following section draws heavily on this review.) 
The first of these groups ("nativist") are those which refer to innate 
characteristics of the part of the human cognitive system which is specialized 
for language acquisition (the LAD), and include the work of Krashen (Monitor 
Theory, or MT). Larsen-Freeman and Long comment that 
MT offers no explanation for the morpheme orders on which many of 
its claims are based and supposedly tested, nor for any other 
developmental sequences ... [rather, it] appeals to Chomskyan UG to 
explain acquisition.(p. 248) 
Associated with UG, "learnability theory" (e.g., Wexler & Cullicover, 1980; cf. 
O'Grady, 1987), specifies important mechanisms (mentioned above) which 
interact with the LAD (or constitute it) -none of them are referred to explicitly 
by Krashen, however.13 
13 His (1983) paper comes the closest, with the "notice the gap" device. 
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Environmentalist theories are exemplified in the work of Schumann and 
Andersen. The absence of explanatory mechanisms in Schumann's work that 
Larsen-Freeman and Long find may be connected with the fact that 
Schumann's theory is close to a "factor model" (van Geert, 1990), in which 
success in SL learning is attributed to several factors (e.g., aptitude, 
accommodation, integrative motivation, etc.) and scores on some measure of SL 
achievement are related to such factors in terms of variance explained. 
The problem with a factor model, however, is that it actually represents an 
empirical generalization.... the theory does not provide a description of a 
mechanism in the real world, of real world inputs to that mechanism, and of 
real world outcomes. There is no mechanism in the world out there that takes 
as its input a value of three factors, and that produces a specific cognitive 
achievement level as its output. There is a mechanism, though, as far as 
cognitive achievement is concerned. It is an information processing 
mechanism, processing input information on the basis of production rules and 
representations stored in memory. Any explanatory model of cognitive 
achievement should consist of a model of this information processing 
mechanism. It is this explanatory model-and not the hidden descriptive 
factor model-that should generate our predictions of future cognitive 
achievement, skills, and knowledge. (van Geert, 1990, p. 194). Schumann's 
recent work appears to reflect an awareness of this sort of weakness (cf. 
Schumann, 1990). 
In Andersen's (1979, 1983) work, the concept of 'Nativization" may imply 
an explanatory mechanism, however. Nativization 
refers to the learner's tendency to make new input conform to his or 
her internal norm or mental picture of what the L2 grammar is like. It 
involves assimilation of new knowledge to old (in the shape of 
knowledge of the L1 and pragmatics) through hypothesis formation 
and application of cognitive processing principles like Slobin's (1973) 
operating principles... Denativization on the other hand guides 
depidginization and later stages of first and second language 
acquisition.(p. 265) 
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Andersen explicitly uses an existing model-the learner as pidgin creator-and 
applies its associated mechanisms to a new situation, that of L2learning. 
By interactionist, Larsen-Freeman and Long mean theories which utilize 
the interaction between environment and innate aspects of cognition in 
explaining SLA, such as that of the ZISA group (e.g., Clahsen, 1984; Pienemann, 
1987), which takes the form of a stage theory. The most well-known stage 
theory in the social sciences is probably Piaget' s, concerning child 
development. Children utilize a series of "schemes": cognitive structures of 
some sort, which are modified through experience with input data. 
Developments of this concept (e.g. Case, 1978, and cf. Flavell, 1982) have 
utilized, for example, known growth in cognitive capacities, specifically the 
child's short-term memory capacity, to explain stages in cognitive functioning. 
The mechanism Pienemann and his colleagues have posited to explain the 
observed sequence of stages in SL learners' acquisition of syntax in a variety of 
second languages 
consists in the shedding of [processing] strategies, or the gradual 
removal of the constraints they impose on what is processable ... the 
complexity of a structure is determined by the type of reordering and 
rearrangement of constituents necessary to map underlying meaning 
on to surface form. (Larsen-Freeman & Long, 1991, p. 272) 
The model also attempts to connect "contextual" social-psychological 
factors with cognitive factors, specifically variation in degree of use of 
simplification and processing strategies. It thus demonstrates the possibility of 
tying more distal variables (such as those posited by Schumann) to mechanisms 
which because they are of the same nature as the learning process itself are 
inherently more explanatory than e.g. social forces. However, unlike other 
stage theories (e.g., Piagetian theories, or those of social functioning such as 
Kohlberg's) the model does not require the gradual accumulation of a series of 
strategies. 
Both associationist and production system strands of computational 
theory format are beginning to appear in discussions of SLA. For example, 
Anderson's ACT"' production system model of skill learning is appealed to 
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directly by O'Malley, Chamot, and Walker (1987). Its major explanatory 
mechanism of learning is "composition"-the collapsing of separate steps of 
processing as a given production system is used repeatedly. McLaughlin (1990; 
d. Lightbown, 1985) feels that an additional mechanism, "restructuring'', is 
needed, which refers to the transition from representations of language as 
whole units in memory to more abstract, rule-like representations. (See 
Schmidt, to appear, for discussion.) The generality of the concept allows it to 
be used to refer to almost any cases of sudden movement of ILs toward (or 
occasionally away from) the target language. A number of other learning 
mechanisms are utilized in production system models {e. g., proceduralization, 
discrimination, generalization-Neches, Langley, & Klahr, 1987; cf. vanLehn, 
1990), though no SLA theorists have yet to avail themselves of the large range 
of possibilities appearing in this area. 
Connectionist approaches are discussed in an SLA context by Gasser 
(1990) and Sokolik (1990). The importance of mechanism and model explains 
one major attraction of connectionism -its explicit use of models related (albeit 
distantly, d. Loritz, to appear) to neural networks. The associated mechanism 
in this case is the strengthening or weakening of tendencies for simple 
processing units to stimulate or inhibit others. It is notable that many reports in 
this paradigm do not merely imply an iconic model, but actually present 
diagrammatic representations of the network being proposed in the course of 
the exposition (e.g., Dell, 1989; Sternberger, 1985). 
I have cited various authorities on the point that theories, even in the 
physical sciences, are rarely stated formally, almost never as hypothetico-
deductive systems; but on the other hand I have said this may not be too bad 
since a formally-stated hypothetico-deductive system alone probably does not 
deliver what we expect of a theory: a satisfying explanation. That, I have 
alleged (with Long, and others), is the responsibility of the model(s) and/or 
mechanism(s) associated with the theoretical system in question. In the 
immediately preceding section, I have supported the critical remarks of 
Atkinson for L1A and Long for SLA concerning the lack of clarity of 
mechanisms advanced by theorists of language acquisition. Following Harre, 
for explanatory purposes a theory must consist of two elements: (a) statements 
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and {b) models or mechanisms. Even though we may recognize that a theory is 
a cognitive object, if it is to be utilized and communicated it must be embodied 
(even if variously) in a maximally clear fashion. The question then becomes, 
how can this clarity be achieved? 
4.3 Formalisms in SLA theory 
Though not all theories may be susceptible to formalization,14 many 
scientists as well as philosophers of science would argue that formalizing a 
theory, or stating a theory formally, is desirable, for the sort of reasons 
advanced by Suppes (1960, p. 296): 
The attempt to characterize exactly models of an empirical theory 
almost inevitably yields a more precise and clearer understanding of 
the exact character of the theory. The emptiness and shallowness of 
many classical theories in the social sciences is well brought out by the 
attempt to formulate in any exact fashion what constitutes a model of 
the theory. The kind of theory which mainly consists of insightful 
remarks and heuristic slogans will not be amenable to this treatment. 
The effort to make it exact will at the same time reveal the weakness of 
the theory. 
Given the paucity of discussions of the methodology of SLA theory 
construction, it is not surprising that there has been little consideration of this 
issue. An exception is Gregg (1989, p. 30), who remarks that "formalisms, in 
short, are Good Things". Gregg accepts Wexler & Cullicover's (1980) assertion 
that "a sufficiently precise theory" of what is to be learned is "a prerequisite for 
creating or evaluating" a learning theory, and calls for 11a well-articulated 
formal characterization of the domain" {Gregg, 1989, p. 24). This refers to only 
the lowest of three possible levels to which the concept of formalism can apply 
for an acquisition theory (if the distinction between competence and 
14 Scientifically accepted theories exist which are unformalizable, since their central concepts 
have "contingent features ... not deducible from some set of first principles" (Harre, 1985, 
p. 181). 
For Harre a case in point is the virus theory of disease. and also cites social psychology as a 
general area unlikely to be axiomatizable; molecular biology (Culp & Kitcher, 1989) has 
also been labelled thus. 
THEORY FORMAT AND STRUCTURE AND SLA THEORY 81 
performance is accepted). The lowest level of formalism concerns the use of a 
formal linguistic theory, whose formalism might well be syntactic symbols15 
Second, the system which acts on the learner's knowledge (the learning 
procedure) can also be represented in a formalism. For example, Pinker (1987) 
uses a production system model, which, though designed with the linguistic 
formalism of lexical-functional grammar in mind, is intended to work with 
other types of grammar too. (This is obviously desirable since applied 
linguistics is strewn with attempts to use linguistic theories which have rapidly 
been discarded by their originators) Finally, the entire structure may be 
represented formally, as Wexler and Culicover's (1980) theory is. They present 
their theory as a set-theory predicate; the overall formalism which they use for 
their acquisition theory is Model-Theoretic. As they state (1980, p. 31): "a 
theory of (first) language acquisition may be looked on as a triple <G, I, LP>", 
where G is the grammar (level one just mentioned, I the input data, which can 
also be specified formally in the same formal language as the grammar), and LP 
is the learning procedure. 
Formalisms are, of course, not sufficient for successful theory construction 
In his analysis of the successful explanation of phenomena in the interactions of 
atomic nuclei and neutrons, Cushing (1989) indicates that the investigations 
proceeded without difficulty partly because (1) a clear (though not complete) 
analogy existed between an existing system (the interactions of photons and 
electrons) and the system of interest; and (2) partly because the earlier work 
provided "a language with which to discuss, organize and interpret more data" 
(p. 17). Other generally accepted principles were then used to further support 
the explanations offered: 
A tightly knit interplay among experiment, theory, and general beliefs 
... cement[ed] this model in to a stable, accepted configuration. 
(Cushing, 1989, p. 17) 
The language, or formalism, had not been sufficient on its own, however. 
Cushing concludes that 
15 Some conceptual confusion here may be engendered by theorists who refer to the need for 
a sequence of theories as a way of describing L1 development (e.g., Atkinson, 1982). 
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[s]uccessful theories are made to work; they don't just work on their 
own or because nature demands it. Once we are inside a formalism ... 
we may feel that its own internal logic seems compelling... within the 
framework of the present, 'correct' theory. An essential aspect 
overlooked by such an approach is how one buys into the starting 
assumptions of the formalism." (p. 18) 
This is a suitably balanced judgement to be applied to the question of 
formalisms in SLA theory and research. If the SLA field is to couch its theories 
in formal terms at the highest level of abstraction then there is no practical 
alternative to set theory. Adopting set-theory formalism should facilitate the 
utilization of analogies to other structures since it is maximally applicable 
across science (and philosophy of science). At the next level down, at least two 
major formal languages are available for the computational modeling of 
language acquisition, and although some authorities see them as conceptually 
incompatible, a number of partial models of language production, at least, use 
elements or concepts associated with both. Finally, if the field is to use a formal 
linguistic theory because an acquisition theory requires an associated 'clearly 
expounded' descriptive theory, then the choice of (formal) linguistic theory 
should be informed by considerations such as whether the descriptive theory in 
question lends itself to use in an acquisition context, and should not be 
associated with a single competence theory. 
A general objection to the advocacy or use of formalisms is often 
mentioned-that it prevents work from being accessible. It seems however, 
that within the limitations of human cognitive and social systems for 
knowledge transmission and processing we are inevitably faced with a trade-
off of reliability and validity against accessibility. At the same time, if high 
school teachers of science do not hesitate to utilize mathematical formalisms to 
present the results of Newtonian physics to children, perhaps social science 
professionals should not shrink from acquiring the tools necessary to 
adequately handle the subject matter they specialize in. In addition, so long as 
a productive heuristic for science is the borrowing of models and languages 
from related fields, it will be those who do not have the formalisms who will be 
hampered. 
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S. Conclusion 
A major concern of this paper is to facilitate the construction and 
understanding of theories in SLA. If we are going to theorize, we need to be 
clear why we perform this act, and how it can be done to best achieve our goal. 
Informed action is crucial-that is to say, we must have understanding of our 
actions at one level above them: a meta-awareness. Applied linguistics has 
been criticized by many, and rightly, for always looking inward, and rarely to 
its neighboring disciplines. It did not occur to those critics that we also need to 
look up, at the superordinate disciplines which constitute the science of science. 
In this paper, like an increasing number of other SL investigators, I have 
attempted to redress this previous weakness, so that, simply put, we can see 
what we're doing. 
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